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Introduction
In response to the global financial crisis, there has 
been  much  discussion  globally  about  how  the 
infrastructure  and  risk  management  practices  in 
financial markets can be improved to ensure they are 
more resilient.1 In particular, the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and the problems experienced in resolving 
issues at the troubled insurer AIG have highlighted 
the  need  for  improvement  in  risk  management 
practices  in  many  over-the-counter  (OTC) 
derivative  markets.  One  of  the  main  proposals 
under  consideration  is  to  increase  the  use  of 
central  counterparties.2  This  has  the  potential  to 
improve  counterparty  risk  management  through 
multilateral netting, provide operational efficiencies 
and more effective default resolution, and increase 
market transparency. 
Central  counterparties  have  long  been  used  in 
exchange-traded equity and derivative markets and, 
*1 Mark  Manning  was  in  Payments  Policy  Department  during  his 
secondment  from  the  Bank  of  England.  Alex  Heath  and  James 
Whitelaw  are  from  International  Department.  The  authors  would   
like  to  thank  Adam  Creighton  of  Payments  Policy  Department,   
and  Andrew  Zurawski  of  International  Department  for   
statistical assistance.
1  Ahead of the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh in late September 2009, the 
Financial Stability Board made a range of commitments, subsequently 
endorsed  by  the  G-20  Leaders,  to  improve  practices  in  financial 
markets. See FSB (2009).
2  Cecchetti, Gyntelberg and Hollanders (2009) outline the economic 
benefits  of  central  counterparties  and  provide  an  update  on 
regulatory and market developments.
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the financial crisis has led to considerable efforts to improve risk management practices in financial 
markets. One of the main proposals being suggested in international fora is to increase the use of 
central counterparties. this article discusses the potential for central counterparty arrangements to 
complement existing risk management practices in the foreign exchange market.
over the past decade or so, have been developed 
for a range of OTC derivatives including interest rate 
and equity products. Following the recent market 
disruptions,  considerable  effort  has  also  been 
devoted  to  setting  up  central  counterparties  for 
credit derivatives. In contrast, central counterparties 
have not been widely used in the foreign exchange 
market,  and  there  has  been  only  limited  support 
from  industry  participants  for  a  move  in  this 
direction (FXC 2009; FXJSC 2009; ISDA 2009a). This 
article first discusses the general case for the use 
of  central  counterparties  and  then  considers  the 
application  of  these  arrangements  to  the  foreign 
exchange market. 
The Role of Central Counterparties 
in OTC Markets
In  the  absence  of  a  central  counterparty,  the   
original  counterparties  to  an  OTC  derivative 
trade  retain  direct  obligations  to  one  another 
for  the  life  of  the  contract.  Should  one  party 
fail  and  the  contract  be  terminated,  the  other 
party  faces  the  risk  that  replacing  the  trade 
might  only  be  possible  on  unfavourable  terms. 
At  least  in  the  inter-dealer  market,  bilateral 
arrangements of this nature are often underpinned 
by  standard  legal  documentation  developed 
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Association  (ISDA),  which  sets  the  parameters  for   
the  management  of  this  replacement-cost  risk 
through  bilateral  (close-out)  netting  and  margin 
requirements. 
In  contrast  to  these  arrangements,  a  central 
counterparty  assumes  responsibility  for  the 
obligations  associated  with  the  contract  by 
becoming the buyer to every seller, and the seller 
to every buyer. This occurs through a legal process 
known  as  novation.  As  such,  numerous  bilateral 
exposures are substituted for a single exposure to 
a  highly  rated  central  counterparty. The  resulting 
multilateral netting has the potential to substantially 
reduce the size of outstanding obligations relative 
to bilateral arrangements. These smaller exposures 
are  then  typically  subject  to  standardised  risk 
management  tools,  including  initial  and  mark-to-
market margins.3 A central counterparty also typically 
maintains additional financial resources to deal with 
a default. These resources may include, for example, 
participant  contributions  to  a  pooled  guarantee 
fund and/or the central counterparty’s own capital. 
A  central  counterparty  can  also  encourage  more 
streamlined trade and post-trade processing. 
Since  a  central  counterparty  has  full  information 
on  outstanding  exposures  related  to  trades  that 
have been novated to it, it is also well positioned to 
manage a participant’s default. As central counter-
3  Initial margin is collected at the time a position is established to cover 
potential adverse price moves between the time the last mark-to-
market margin call was settled and the time at which a defaulter’s 
open positions can be closed out. A central counterparty typically 
makes mark-to-market margin calls at least daily, collecting funds from 
participants that have incurred mark-to-market losses on their open 
positions, and paying funds to those with mark-to-market gains. 
parties  can  see  the  size  and  location  of  market 
exposures across all participants, they can mitigate 
systemic  risks  by  managing  the  close-out  and 
replacement of trades in the event of a participant 
default.  They  can  also  provide  regulators  with  a   
clear  focal  point  for  regulation,  as  well  as  a   
centralised source for the collection and publication 
of trading data.
Notwithstanding these benefits, a central counter-
party model raises a number of issues. First, a central 
counterparty  concentrates  counterparty  risk  on  a 
single institution. The potential systemic importance 
of  this  institution  places  greater  emphasis  on  the 
need for appropriate risk management practices by 
the central counterparty. 
Second,  novating  some  contracts  to  a  central 
counterparty can have the unintended consequence 
of increasing the counterparty risk among products 
that are not novated because less bilateral netting 
is  possible  (Duffie  and  Zhu 2009).  Without  more 
information, it is difficult to assess how much this   
‘un-netting’  might  offset  the  reduction  in   
counterparty risk that occurs through the multilateral 
netting  of  contracts.  It  depends  on  a  number  of   
factors  that  affect  the  scope  of  both  bilateral 
cross-product  netting  agreements  and  central   
counterparty  coverage,  and  the  nature  of   
participants’  portfolios.  The  degree  of  un-netting 
could  be  mitigated  by  central  counterparties 
accepting a broad range of products, although this 
would  increase  the  concentration  of  risk  on  the 
central counterparty and not all products are suitable 
for novation to a central counterparty. 
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The  above  discussion  makes  it  clear  that  the  net 
benefits of a central counterparty will differ across 
the  various  OTC  derivative  instruments  and  will 
depend on at least three broad factors. 
•    Product  characteristics:  Central  counterparties 
can most easily manage the replacement cost 
risks of products that have reliable and frequently 
quoted prices and relatively standardised terms. 
The  scale  of  replacement-cost  risks  is  larger, 
and therefore potentially harder to manage, for 
products with more volatile prices, settlement 
dates further into the future and larger amounts 
outstanding.
•    Structure  of  participation:  The  greater  the 
number  of  counterparties  and  the  number 
of  trading  relationships  between  them,  the 
larger  the  benefits  of  multilateral  netting  and 
default-management  arrangements  provided 
by a central counterparty. The reduction in the 
administrative  burden  of  maintaining  bilateral 
relationships,  which  includes  individual  credit 
checks,  position  monitoring  and  back-office 
procedures, will also be larger. The structure of 
participation  and  the  nature  of  the  portfolios 
being managed will also affect the scale of un-
netting that may occur with the introduction of 
a central counterparty.
•    Existing  risk  management  and  post-trade 
processes:  The  benefits  from  introducing  a 
central counterparty depend on the breadth and 
quality of existing collateralisation and other risk 
management practices, including the degree of 
automation in post-trade processes. 
Even in situations where an evaluation of these factors 
might argue in favour of a central counterparty, the 
market might not voluntarily adopt such a solution. 
First, individual participants may not fully internalise 
the costs of systemic risk and therefore place less 
weight  on  the  risk-reducing  benefits  of  a  central 
counterparty; this is more likely to be the case if some 
institutions are perceived to be too big to fail. Second, 
in bilaterally cleared OTC derivative markets, dealers 
with high credit ratings should, other things being 
equal, be better placed to compete for business; a 
central counterparty could remove this competitive 
advantage and therefore reduce their incentive to 
support its development. Finally, coordination issues 
may also arise. Even where private incentives may 
be  sufficiently  strong,  a  workable  market  solution 
may require industry participants to coordinate to 
introduce a new market structure. Cooperation to 
design and fund a new piece of infrastructure can 
be difficult, particularly where participants otherwise 
compete with one another. In some cases, the public 
sector may be required to facilitate and encourage 
cooperation, as was the case with the establishment 
of  CLS Bank in 2002 (see below).
The Foreign Exchange Market
As discussed above, the benefits of using a central 
counterparty are likely to vary across OTC derivative 
instruments depending on the characteristics of the 
products, the structure of the market, and the existing 
risk  management  practices  and  infrastructure. 
This section discusses these aspects of the foreign 
exchange market and, in particular, how they might 
bear on the potential role for a central counterparty. 
Product characteristics
The foreign exchange market is very large, with more 
than US$3 trillion of value traded daily across products 
in 2007, the most recent year for which global data 
are available (Table 1). The largest segment is foreign 
exchange  swaps,  which  accounted  for  around 
US$1.7 trillion  of  daily  turnover  in  2007.  Foreign 52 ReseRve Bank Of austRalia
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The total value of outstanding positions in the foreign 
exchange market was US$58 trillion in June 2007. 
While average daily turnover is concentrated in spot 
and short-dated foreign exchange swap transactions, 
turnover in longer-dated foreign exchange contracts 
accumulates  to  a  sizeable  share  of  outstanding 
positions: in 2007, the value of outstanding forward, 
foreign  exchange  and  currency  swap  contracts 
with  a  term  longer  than  seven  days  is  estimated 
to have been around US$42 trillion. The scale and 
term  of  these  outstanding  positions  indicate  that 
replacement-cost  risk  could  be  a  significant  issue 
for participants in the foreign exchange market. In 
combination, therefore, the characteristics of foreign 
exchange  instruments  suggest  that  there  could 
be a role for central counterparties in the foreign 
exchange market.
exchange swaps, as well as spot and outright forward 
contracts, are highly standardised, generally liquid, 
and subject to transparent pricing. As a result, more 
than half of spot transactions and up to 30 per cent of 
transactions in forwards and foreign exchange swaps 
are executed across electronic platforms (Gallardo 
and Heath 2009). Since many of the characteristics 
that facilitate electronic trading also allow for more 
efficient  netting  and  reliable  risk  management, 
these markets are, in principle, good candidates for 
novation to a central counterparty. Similarly, currency 
swaps typically have relatively simple structures and 
can be reliably priced. Foreign exchange options, on 
the other hand, are less standardised and less liquid 
and their pricing is typically less transparent.







currency   
swap
Foreign 
exchange   
option
Average daily 
turnover April 2007  1 005 362 1 714 31 212
of which < 7days na 154 1 329 6 na
> 7days na 208 382 25 na
Average term(a)
< 7days na 2 2 2 na
> 7days na 99 107 293 na
Outstanding positions(b) 
end June 2007 na 9 836 19 935 14 127 13 662
of which  < 7days na 165 1 425 24 na
> 7days na 9 671 18 510 14 103 na 
(a)  RBA calculations based on BIS (2007).
(b)    Outstanding positions are from BIS Table E.38. Breakdowns between forwards and foreign exchange swaps and of outstanding 
positions by term are estimates based on turnover data in BIS Table E.1.
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Structure of participation
As noted above, the structure of participation in a 
market, in particular the number of counterparties, 
can affect the extent to which multilateral netting 
reduces counterparty risk. Although there is a wide 
range of end-users in the foreign exchange market, 
including businesses, individuals and governments, 
the vast majority of transactions – by value – is carried 
out  by  a  relatively  small  number  of  large  dealers. 
According to the most recent Euromoney survey, the 
top five dealers account for more than 60 per cent 
of  the  value  of  transactions  globally  (Euromoney 
2009). This is consistent with statistics from the BIS, 
which show that in 2007, even in the largest foreign 
exchange markets of the United Kingdom and the 
United States, 75 per cent of turnover was accounted 
for by no more than 12 banks (Table 2). A market 
with 12 larger participants is likely to deliver some 
benefits in the form of operational efficiencies and 
multilateral netting (see below), but whether these 
are large enough to offset costs such as un-netting is 
an empirical issue that is difficult to address without 
additional information. 
The  structure  of  the  foreign  exchange  market 
suggests that participation in a central counterparty 
would be likely to be tiered; i.e. large dealers would 
become  direct  clearing  members  and,  in  turn, 
provide  client-clearing  services  to  other  market 
participants. This might raise questions for regulators 
around  the  potential  for  a  high  concentration  of 
risk in – and high level of dependence on – a small 
group  of  direct  clearing  members. There  are  also 
issues regarding the segregation of client positions 
and collateral, and their portability in the event of a 
participant’s default. 
The global nature of the foreign exchange market 
also  raises  some  important  considerations  for  the 
implementation  of  a  central  counterparty,  with 
around  75 per  cent  of  total  turnover  distributed 
over seven trading centres (Table 2). This suggests 
that any central counterparty for foreign exchange 
might  be  global  in  nature.  This  would  both  be 
operationally complex and require a high level of 
cooperation  among  regulators.  However,  global 
provision  of  central  counterparty  services  is  not 
without  precedent.  For  instance,  LCH.Clearnet’s 
SwapClear covers interest rate swaps in 14 currencies 
and is expanding its membership to accommodate 
participants  in  multiple  markets.  In  addition,  CLS, 
the  existing  centralised  settlement  service  for  the 
foreign exchange market, also operates effectively 
across multiple markets. 
Table 2: Global Foreign Exchange Markets
April 2007
Number of banks accounting for 
75% of turnover in each market
Share of global turnover 
(%)
United Kingdom 12 34.1
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Existing risk management and  
post-trade processes
In the foreign exchange market, bilateral counter-
party  risk  mitigation  practices  are  common  and 
market  participants  have  access  to  some  of  the 
post-trade  services  typically  offered  by  a  central 
counterparty through the centralised international 
settlement infrastructure provided by CLS Bank.
Bilateral payment and close-out netting under ISDA 
Master Agreements is common market practice in 
the  foreign  exchange  market  (FXJSC  2009).  Data 
from the BIS indicate that enforceable (often cross-
product)  bilateral  netting  agreements  reduce  the 
total  gross  value  across  all  global  OTC  derivative 
positions by around 85 per cent – a netting ratio   
of 6.8.4 Assuming that the same netting ratio applies 
to foreign exchange contracts with a term longer 
than  seven  days,  the  outstanding  position  of 
US$42 trillion noted earlier amounts to an effective 
exposure closer to US$6 trillion. Based on the stylised 
and  simplifying  assumption  that  this  exposure  is 
distributed equally across 12 equal-sized participants 
in the foreign exchange market, this implies that each 
participant will have an exposure of US$520 billion   
after bilateral netting. 
Using these estimates, it is possible to make some 
illustrative  calculations  of  the  potential  size  of 
replacement-cost risk facing each participant under 
4  This netting ratio is derived with reference to Table 1, p 5 of BIS (2009). It 
is the comparison of the gross credit exposure of US$3.7 trillion, which 
takes into account legally enforceable bilateral netting agreements, 
with the total gross market value of US$25.4 trillion.
different  assumptions  about  risk  management 
arrangements. Assuming one of the 12 participants 
defaults; that this participant has a mark-to-market 
loss on its exposure; and the other 11 participants 
have  equal  mark-to-market  gains;  then  the  non-
defaulting  participants  will  incur  costs  to  replace 
the  contracts  on  which  the  other  participant  has 
defaulted.  Assuming  an  extreme  exchange  rate 
movement  of  15  per  cent  on  all  contracts,  the 
cumulative  exposure  where  there  is  no  bilateral 
netting  would  be  almost  US$50  billion  for  each 
participant (Table 3).5 If it is assumed that bilateral 
netting  is  used  by  all  participants,  then  the 
cumulative exposure for each participant would be 
around US$7 billion.
In  OTC  markets,  it  is  becoming  increasingly 
common to supplement the use of bilateral netting 
agreements  with  collateral  agreements  (typically 
ISDA  Credit  Support  Annexes)  to  effectively  post 
margin against mark-to-market losses on bilaterally 
netted  exposures.  According  to  the  most  recent 
survey by ISDA of collateralisation practices, almost 
50  per  cent  of  exposures  by  value  across  foreign 
exchange derivative products were collateralised at 
the end of 2008 (ISDA 2009b). In addition, the use 
of  standard  bilateral  collateralisation  agreements 
for foreign exchange contracts has almost certainly 
increased since the onset of the recent financial crisis 
when concerns about counterparty risk intensified. 
5  Specifically,  the  US$3.5  trillion  position  of  each  participant 
(US$42 trillion divided by 12) is multiplied by 15 per cent to obtain   
the  mark-to-market  loss  from  default  and  then  divided among the 
remaining 11 participants. A 15 per cent change in the exchange rate 
is consistent with the 99th percentile of the distribution of EUR/USD 
currency returns over the 15 years to 2009, calculated for horizons 
longer than 100 days.
Table 3: Risk Implications of Alternative Risk Management Arrangements
US$ billion
total loss shared  Individual bank’s loss
No counterparty risk management 528.6 48.1
Bilateral netting only 78.0 7.1
Bilateral netting and mark-to-market margin 7.8 0.7
Central counterparty 0 0
Source: authors’ calculations55 Bulletin |  March Quarter 2010
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Furthermore,  risk  management  tools  other  than 
collateralisation,  such  as  position  limits,  early 
termination options, and charges over balance sheet 
assets, are often applied in relation to non-financial 
end-users of OTC derivatives. 
To  the  extent  that  participants  in  the  foreign 
exchange  market  do  use  standard  bilateral 
collateralisation  agreements,  their  exposure  to 
counterparty risk will be lower than if they only use 
bilateral  netting.  Extending  the  above  example,  if 
all  market  participants  are  paying  mark-to-market 
margins to each other to settle gains and losses on 
outstanding  positions  each  day,  they  ensure  that 
their maximum exposure in the event of a default is 
only the price movement over one day. Assuming an 
adverse exchange rate movement over one day of 
1.5 per cent, the potential loss falls from US$7 billion 
to US$0.7 billion, a tenfold decrease.6 This highlights 
the  importance  of  netting  and  posting  mark-to-
market margins in the management of replacement 
cost risk.
In  general,  a  central  counterparty  enforces  mark-
to-market  margining  and  also  requires  an  initial 
margin  to  be  posted  at  the  time  a  position  is 
established.  Given  that  a  central  counterparty 
allows  for  multilateral  netting,  the  total  amount 
of initial margin that needs to be posted could be 
significantly lower than what would be needed if 
only bilateral netting were possible. Based on some 
simplifying assumptions, in a market with 12 equal-
sized participants multilateral netting could reduce 
exposures relative to the case where there is only 
bilateral  netting  by  a  factor  of  more  than  three.7 
Using the estimates in this example would reduce 
the initial margin to be posted from US$0.7 billion 
to US$0.2 billion. Thus, when considering different 
risk management arrangements, each participant is 
comparing the low-probability loss of US$0.7 billion 
with  bilateral  netting  and  mark-to-market  margin 
6   A 1.5 per cent change in the exchange rate is consistent with the 
99th percentile of the distribution of EUR/USD daily currency returns.
7  Assuming that trading positions are drawn from a normal distribution, 
the netting ratio will be equal to the square root of the number of 
trading partners (Jackson and Manning 2007).
with  the  interest  costs  associated  with  an  initial 
margin of US$0.2 billion with a central counterparty. 
Another important feature of the risk management 
infrastructure in the foreign exchange market is CLS, 
which  was  introduced  in  response  to  regulatory 
concern  about  the  scale  of  foreign  exchange 
settlement  risk  (also  known  as  Herstatt  risk). 
Settlement  risk  arises  if  the  two  legs  of  a  foreign 
exchange transaction are not settled simultaneously, 
leaving  one  party  exposed  to  a  gross  exposure 
should its counterparty default. CLS eliminates this 
settlement  risk  by  coordinating  the  exchange  of 
currencies  by  way  of  a ‘payment-versus-payment’ 
settlement  process.  Since  its  introduction,  the 
number of participants in CLS and the volume of 
foreign  exchange  transactions  settling  through  it 
have increased such that more than half of all trades 
are now settled via CLS (CPSS 2008).8 Even before 
the default of Lehman Brothers, foreign exchange 
market participants were exploring ways to expand 
the coverage and penetration of CLS (both in terms 
of participants and currencies) and were looking to 
introduce a facility for same-day settlement in CLS. 
The financial crisis has heightened interest in these 
enhancements, although there are limits to what can 
be achieved, particularly in the near term. CLS also 
recently announced its intention to use its extensive 
transaction-level data to provide a trade repository 
service  for  the  foreign  exchange  market  to  meet 
regulators’ demands for market transparency. 
Although CLS does not manage the replacement- 
cost risks arising prior to settlement, which is a core 
function  of  a  central  counterparty,  it  does  carry 
out  other  key  post-trade  functions  that  might  be 
provided by a central counterparty in other contexts 
(Table 4). Thus, while the basic role played by each is 
quite distinct, there is some overlap. 
8  It is believed that market penetration has recently increased further, 
reflecting a heightened focus on counterparty credit risk in the wake 
of the Lehman Brothers’ default. See CLS (2009) for a further discussion 
of the global foreign exchange market and the role of CLS.56 ReseRve Bank Of austRalia
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Conclusion
This  article  has  discussed  the  potential  role  for 
central  counterparties  in  the  foreign  exchange 
market. With high outstanding notional values and 
volatile price movements, it is important for robust 
arrangements  for  managing  replacement-cost  risk 
to be in place. One way of achieving this would be 
through the introduction of a central counterparty. 
However,  before  steps  in  this  direction  are  taken, 
further  work  is  needed  to  assess  the  benefits  of 
a  central  counterparty  in  the  foreign  exchange 
market, particularly given the arrangements that are 
currently in place to manage counterparty risk.  R
Table 4: Post-trade Services Offered by Typical Central Counterparties and CLS
Post-trade process explanation central counterparty(a) cLS
Matching Counterparties confirm the economic 
terms of the trade with each other 
in order to mitigate operational 
risk and contractual disputes, and 





Contract becomes legally binding, 
generally according to standard 





Obligations arising in relation to 
the trades are calculated among 
participants
P P
Novation A third party becomes the legally 
binding counterparty to both sides 





Participants’ obligations to and from 
other participants are netted as 
though participants were dealing 





The calculation and collection of 
initial and variation margin from 
adverse prices moves and participant 





Payment obligations at trade 
termination date are calculated on a 
net basis across participants
P P
Settlement Final settlement of payment 
obligations between counterparties
O P
(a)    The precise functions carried out by central counterparties vary. Here, we assume a typical model whereby the central 
counterparty accepts a feed from an electronic trading venue or confirmations processing platform, calculates and risk 
manages participants’ obligations and then submits net settlement instructions to a payment system.
(b)  Payment obligations in CLS are netted, although settlement is gross. 
(b)57 Bulletin |  March Quarter 2010
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